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2EVA PRA Objectives and Scope
The Shuttle Program initiated an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA) to assess the risks associated with performing a
Shuttle Thermal Protection System (TPS) repair during the Space
Transportation System (STS)-125 Hubble repair mission as part of risk trades
between TPS repair and crew rescue.
Scope was to assess contingency EVA to perform one of the TPS repairs listed:
• Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) Crack Repair
• RCC Plug Repair
• Tile Emittance Wash
• Tile Overlay Repair
• Shuttle Tile Ablator Repair
Systems/hazards included in the EVA PRA scope were:
• Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)
• Airlock and Hatches
• Communication System (Comm)
• Remote Manipulator System/Orbiter Boom Sensor System (RMS/OBSS)
• EVA tools/aids (e.g., tether, Portable Foot Restraint (PFR), TPS repair tools, etc.)
• Human interface
• External events/hazards (Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD), sharp edges, etc.)
3EVA PRA Overview
The EVA PRA model was developed by a team of PRA analysts and domain 
experts providing technical inputs.
• PRA analysts were highly skilled analysts with many years of experience in 
PRA—most were engineers.
• Domain experts included personnel from the following:
– NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Engineering, NASA JSC Safety & Mission 
Assurance (S&MA), Boeing (Orbiter) and MDA for Orbiter-related systems and hazards 
(airlock, hatches, Comm, and RMS)
– EVA S&MA and EVA Project Office for EVA-related systems and hazards
– Mission Operations Directorate
– Flight Crew Operations Directorate
– Astromaterials Research and Exploration Science (ARES) for MMOD
4EVA PRA End States
This analysis was developed for two undesirable END STATES— Loss of 
Extravehicular (EV) Crewmember(s) (LECM) and Loss of EVA Mission 
Objective (LEMO) as defined below:
• LECM is the immediate death of an EV crewmember.  
LECM does not include potential long-term effects for external hazards such 
as radiation or decompression sickness.
• LEMO is failure to perform a successful TPS repair.  LEMO includes both 
failure of the EVA to successfully complete the repair and the effectiveness 
of the repair (i.e., materials).
5Events trees/fault trees were developed for the following phases to assess 
the risk of performing a Shuttle TPS repair during the STS-125 Hubble 
repair mission :
• EVA preparation – EMU Day 2 checkout, ingress airlock, close forward hatch 
and depressurize airlock (40 minute exposure time)
• Egress setup – Egress airlock via either aft or upper hatch, tether swap to 
payload bay, tool setup, tether swap to RMS/OBSS, and ingress the portable 
foot restraint (30 minute exposure time)
• Transition to worksite – Transition to worksite on the RMS/OBSS (1 hour 
exposure time)
• TPS repair – Perform and verify the TPS repair (3.5 hour exposure time)
• Transition back to payload bay – Return to payload bay on RMS/OBSS and 
tether swap to payload bay (1 hour exposure time)
• Clean up – Clean up and stow tools (30 minute exposure time)
• Ingress – Tether swap to airlock, ingress airlock and close aft or upper hatch, 
repressurize airlock, and ingress crew cabin via forward hatch (demand only 
no exposure time)
• EV Rescue – Rescue a free floating EV crewmember either pre- or post-
repair (pre-repair would result in LEMO).
EVA PRA Phase Definitions
6Master Logic Diagram
• The next step in the PRA development process was to identify the 
complete set of Initiating Events (IEs) that serve as trigger events in the 
sequences of events (accident scenarios) leading to the end states. 
• An Master Logic Diagram (MLD) was constructed for the EVA PRA to 
identify the types of initiating events to be considered for inclusion in the 
model.
• The IEs were identified from various sources such as hazard report 
reviews, previous analyses, and discussions with system experts.
• The IEs for the EVA PRA were reviewed with EVA domain experts for 
completeness and correctness, along with applicability to the scope and 
objectives for this analysis.
• The high-level MLD for the EVA PRA is shown on the next page.
7Master Logic Diagram (cont.)
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8Event Sequence Diagrams
• The scenarios that may ensue from a given IE were initially developed in 
Event Sequence Diagrams (ESD).
– The ESD can be mapped into an Event Tree (ET), which relates more directly to 
a practical quantification of accident scenarios using standard PRA tools. 
– The ESD representation has a significant advantage over the ET for enhancing 
communication between risk engineers, designers, and crews.
– A good deal of information (e.g., system-level mission success criteria at each 
pivotal event) can also be displayed on the ESD, making it a very compact 
representation of a large amount of modeling information.  
• The ESDs for the EVA PRA were reviewed with EVA domain experts for 
completeness and correctness.
• ESDs were developed for each of the major phases in the EVA as 
previously described.  
• An example ESD for the Transfer-to-Worksite phase of the EVA PRA is 
shown on the next page.
9Event Sequence Diagrams (cont.)
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Event Trees
• From the ESDs corresponding ETs were developed.
– An ET distills the pivotal event scenario definitions from the ESD and presents 
this information in a tree structure that is used to help classify scenarios 
according to their consequences. 
– The ET headings are the IE, the pivotal events, and the end state. The “tree” 
structure below these headings shows the possible scenarios ensuing from the 
IE in terms of the occurrence or non-occurrence of the pivotal events. 
– Each distinct path through the ET is a distinct scenario.
• In the EVA PRA, the initiating event for the overall ET was the occurrence 
of TPS damage, requiring either an EVA repair or crew rescue.  The IEs 
identified in the previously discussed steps were included in the fault trees 
developed to support the pivotal events in the ETs, as described in the 
following pages.
• An example ET from the EVA PRA, which corresponds to the ESD 
example on the previous page, is shown on the next page (by convention, 
the “down” branch is considered to be “failure”).
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Event Trees (cont.)
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Fault Trees
• Top events from the ETs—corresponding to the pivotal events—were 
developed into Fault Trees (FTs).
– FTs depict a set of logical relationships between more complex (more 
aggregated) events, such as system-level failures, and more basic (less 
aggregated) events, such as component-level failures.
– FT modeling is not only applicable to modeling hardware failures, but also to 
other complex event types, including descriptions of the circumstances 
surrounding phenomenological events and crew actions.
• Domain experts (engineering and operations) reviewed the EVA PRA FT 
models and associated assumptions for completeness and correctness.
• FT models were developed to a level of detail that data exists to support 
quantification.  Modeling must be conducted in such a way that 
dependencies between the pivotal events are properly captured.
• An example FT corresponding to one of the pivotal events in the previous 
ET example is shown on the next page.
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Fault Trees (cont.)
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Data Development
• Functional – A functional failure event is generally defined as failure of a 
component type, such as a valve or pump, to perform its intended function.  
– Functional failures are specified by a component type (e.g., motor pump) and by 
a failure mode for the component type (e.g., fails to start).
– Functional failures typically fall into two categories, time-based and demand-
based.
– Functional data was Bayesian updated whenever Shuttle- or EVA-specific data 
was available.
• Phenomenological – Phenomenological events include non-functional 
events that are not solely based on equipment performance, but on 
complex interactions between systems and their environment or other 
external factors or events (i.e., sharp edges, leaks, MMOD and other 
similar situations). 
• Human – Three types of human errors are generally included in fault trees:  
pre-initiating event, initiating event (or human-induced initiators), and post-
initiating event interactions.
• Common Cause – Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are multiple failures of 
similar components within a system that occur within a specified period of 
time due to a shared cause.
Model Quantification
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• The fault trees and associated data were linked to the event trees, and the 
event trees linked together using the Systems Analysis Programs for 
Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) PRA tool to 
generate the EVA PRA model results (cut sets) for each end state of 
interest.
• The cut sets were combined into higher level logical groupings called 
“super tables” for external review by the domain experts for relative risk 
rankings of systems and hazards.
• Results of these reviews were fed back into the EVA PRA model and the 
model iterated until agreement was obtained on the overall results and 
relative risk rankings.
• Uncertainty associated with the data was also included in the EVA PRA 
model quantification to obtain overall uncertainty associated with the end 
states of interest.
• The overall results and relative risk rankings for the LEMO and LECM end 
states are shown on the following pages.
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Overall Results – LEMO
5th Median Mean 95th
LEMO
(Base)
2.24E-02 3.04E-02 3.09E-02 4.09E-02
1:45 1:33 1:32 1:24
LEMO
(No Tool Loss)
1.19E-02 1.62E-02 1.68E-02 2.37E-02
1:84 1:62 1:59 1:42
Base case included all EVA-related systems and hazards, and excluded 
repair material failures and human error associated with the repair 
installation.
The table on the following page provides a risk ranking of the LEMO 
contributors.
1:32
1:45 1:24
1.E-03 1.E-02 1.E-01
Base
No Tool Loss
1:59
1:421:84
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Overall Results – LEMO (continued)
Rank Probability(1:n)
%age of 
Total
Cumulative 
Total Failure Scenario Description
1 1.4E-02(1:70) 45.8 45.8 Loss of EVA Repair Mission due to Loss of Critical Tool
2 6.2E-03(1:160) 19.8 65.6
Loss of EVA Repair Mission due to EMU Initiated Suit Leaks Which 
Lead to EVA Termination
3* 2.0E-03(1:500) 6.5 72.1
Loss of EVA Repair Mission due to Crew Operation of the Shuttle 
Remote Manipulator System (RMS) Causes Additional Damage due to 
Collision and/or Fails to Support Repair Effort 
4* 1.3E-03(1:770) 4.1 76.2 Loss of EVA Repair Mission due to Inadequate Lighting 
5 1.1E-03(1:940) 3.4 79.6 Loss of EVA Repair Mission due to EMU Feedwater Circuit Failure
6 9.8E-04(1:1,000) 3.1 82.8 Loss of EVA Repair Mission due to EMU Electrical Failures
7* 7.7E-04(1:1,300) 2.5 85.2 Loss of EVA Repair Mission due to Sharp Edges
8 6.3E-04(1:1,600) 2.0 87.3 Loss of EVA Repair Mission due to Airlock Functional Failures
9* 6.3E-04(1:1,600) 2.0 89.3 Loss of EVA Repair Mission due to RMS Failures
10 5.5E-04(1:1,800) 1.8 91.1
Loss of EVA Repair Mission due to EMU Initiated Suit Leaks Which 
Lead to an EVA Abort
* Risk drivers that could be updated near real-time during mission
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1:8
1:39 1:2
CRACK REPAIR UNCERTAINTY RESULTS
76%
24%
1:45
Material Failure and Human Error Associated with Performing Repair
Base (Generic Risk across all repairs)
1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00
Base
(No Material or HRA)
Crack Repair  
LEMO Total
1:32
1:24
The LEMO end state was processed for each of the five repair scenarios. The
RCC Crack Repair results are presented in the figure above. The figure shows
the probability of failure for the RCC Crack Repair and the probability of failure
for a generic repair scenario without the repair included.
Overall Results – LEMO (continued)
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Overall Results – LECM
5th Median Mean 95th
LECM
1.41E-04 2.78E-04 3.29E-04 6.72E-04
1:7,100 1:3,600 1:3,000 1:1,500
1:3000
1:15001:7100
1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02
The table on the following page provides a risk ranking of the LECM 
contributors.
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Overall Results – LECM (continued)
Rank Probability(1:n)
%age of 
Total
Cumulative 
Total Failure Scenario Description
1* 1.6E-04(1:6,300) 48.8 48.8
Loss of EVA Crewmember due to Catastrophic MMOD 
Penetration
2 1.1E-04(1:8,700) 35.0 83.8
Loss of EVA Crewmember due to Catastrophic EMU Initiated Suit 
Leaks 
3 1.7E-05(1:60,000) 5.1 88.9 Loss of EVA Crewmember due to Hatch Valve Failure to Repress
4* 1.6E-05(1:62,000) 5.0 93.8 Loss of EVA Crewmember due to Inadvertent Release of OBSS
5* 1.5E-05(1:67,000) 4.6 98.4 Loss of EVA Crewmember due to Sharp Edges
6 1.7E-06(1:600,000) 0.5 98.9 Loss of EVA Crewmember due to Airlock Repress Failure
7 1.5E-06(1:690,000) 0.4 99.3 Loss of EVA Crewmember due to Hatch Repress Failure
8* 1.4E-06(1:730,000) 0.4 99.8 Loss of EVA Crewmember due to MMOD Impact to SSP Airlock
9 7.1E-07(1:1,400,000) 0.2 100.0 Loss of EVA Crewmember due to Trapped Crewmember in Hatch
* Risk drivers that could be updated near real-time during mission
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Conclusions
• The EVA PRA provided the first end-to-end integrated PRA for performing 
a standalone TPS repair.
• The EVA PRA was available to provide a means for risk trades during the 
May 2009 Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Mission in the event of 
suspected critical TPS damage.  
• The HST Servicing Mission was successfully completed on May 24, 2009, 
with no critical TPS damage.
• The EVA PRA laid the foundation upon which future EVA quantitative risk 
assessments could be based.
